Travel time, travel time reliability and monetary cost have been empirically identified as the most important criteria influencing route choice behaviour. We concentrate on travel time and travel time reliability and review two prominent user equilibrium models incorporating these two factors. We discuss some shortcomings of these models and propose alternative bi-objective user equilibrium models that overcome the shortcomings. Finally, based on the observation that both models use standard deviation of travel time within their measure of travel time reliability, we propose a general travel time reliability bi-objective user equilibrium model. We prove that this model encompasses those discussed previously and hence forms a general framework for the study of reliability related user equilibrium. We demonstrate and validate our concepts on a small three-link example.
the chance (or on-time arrival) constraint. In essence, the TTB and PUE models In this paper, we focus on looking at the two main theoretical frameworks, 78 4 i.e. the mean-variance model and the scheduling model, from a multi-objective perspective. Now we look into these two models in more detail.
80
In the mean-variance model, Jackson and Jucker assume that travel time vari-81 ability leads to loss of utility. Every traveller has a prior estimate of the mean 82 and variance of the travel time and the objective of each traveller is expressed by 83 Equation (1).
where λ m is a non-negative parameter which represents the degree to which the 
92
In the scheduling model, Small assumes that not arriving at the destination at 93 the preferred arrival time (PAT) will cause disutility, and the consequence of ar-94 riving early and late could be different. Naturally one would expect that travellers 95 would dislike being late more than being early. The utility function can be ex-96 pressed as in Equation (2).
97 
Now let us look at how these concepts have been applied in equilibrium models. aversion of each user class, as shown in Equation (5).
for all k ∈ K p (the set of all paths from origin to destination of O-D pair p) and reliability chance constraint such that the probability that travel time exceeds the 117 budget is less than a predefined confidence level specified by the traveller to rep- of the utility function in Equation (6).
where k is the decision variable, the path choice, with a longest acceptable travel (dis)utility function, and therefore pre-supposes a certain preference structure. As 6 to 9 will not be considered by a rational traveller, as they are dominated by at but is better in at least one of these criteria. In the equilibrium model of Lo et al. 
212
In Sections 2 and 3, we will describe the travel time budget and late arrival 213 penalty user equilibrium models mathematically. We also introduce bi-objective 214 versions of these models, and prove that the equilibrium solutions of the models user-class-specific parameters and preference assumptions. We prove that all four 219 models mentioned in Sections 2 and 3 are special cases of this general model.
220
Hence, the general model serves as a modelling framework for the study of travel 221 time reliability. We demonstrate our concepts on a small example in Section 5 and 222 draw some conclusions and suggestions for further work in Section 6. 
Travel Time Budget User Equilibrium

224
The travel time budget user equilibrium focuses on modelling the travel be- 
is adopted, where t 0 a is the free-flow travel time and C a is the capacity of link a.
230
Thus, t a (f a ) is the link travel time with link flow f a and β, n are deterministic 231 parameters.
232
Lo and Tung (2003) assume that link capacity follows a uniform distribution,
233
defined by an upper bound (the design capacity) and a lower bound (the worst-234 degraded capacity), which is a fraction, φ a , of the design capacity,c a , i.e.
235
C a ∼ U (φ a ·c a ,c a ) .
Hence φ a serves the role as a reliability parameter for travel time: As derived 236 in Lo and Tung (2003) , the path travel time is normally distributed with mean and 237 standard deviation that can be written as
Here δ k a is the usual link-path incidence, i.e. δ k a = 1 if link a belongs to path k and 239 0 otherwise. By applying the assumption of uniformly distributed arc capacity as 240 expressed in Equation (8), the mean and standard deviation of the route travel time
The probability ρ m that a trip arrives within the travel time budget,
After rearranging (14), we have
Note that the left hand side in Equation (15) is the standard normal variate of T k ,
249
S T k ∼ N(0,1).
250
As pointed out in Section 1, in any solution of the travel time budget equilib- Mathematically, the two objectives are:
where B k is dependent on the level of risk aversion of the individual or user class 266 m, measured by ρ m , which determines the value of λ m as in Equation (15) 
second of these inequalities contradicts the assumption that F satisfies the travel 288 time budget equilibrium condition. in Equation (6) can be simplified to Equation (17) where L(x) is given in Equation
297
(18).
where φ and Φ are the probability density function and cumulative distribution 299 function of a N (0, 1) variate, respectively. In the LAP-UE model, users minimise 300 Equation (6). In this study, we are not concerned with attributes that are indepen-301 dent of time or flow, hence we assume that θ 0 = 0 and we can normalise θ 1 to 1.
302
This also puts the discussion of the model of Watling (2006) in the same framework 
304
The user objective becomes the disutility of path k
We have mentioned before that this model leads to a similar problem to that Mathematically, the two objectives are:
With these objectives, we can define the late arrival penalty bi-objective user 316 equilibrium (LAP-BUE) as follows. 
contradicting the LAP-UE condition. than the assumptions for our model.
358
The common feature of all models discussed so far is that they consider ex- 
362
We observe that both Equations (5) (14) and (15) not risk prone. As a result, the value of λ m will always be greater than zero.
381
In this way, we consider the problem from a multi-objective point of view and 382 we can formulate a general TTR-BUE model with the two objectives
min σ T k .
We consider this formulation general in the sense that we assume that trav- zero flow. This assumption appears to be realistic for rational users.
399
Next we give a mathematical statement of the TTR-BUE model as an equilib-400 rium problem. For notational simplicity, we only state it for a single user class. Proof. We prove both statements separately. 
This combined with E(T k ′ ) E(T k ) shows that F would then also violate 451 the TTB-BUE condition. and σ T k increase and therefore
which, with an analogous argument as in the proof of the first statement, to-
459
gether with E(T k ′ ) E(T k ) and the fact that at least one of the inequalities 460 must be strict, contradicts the LAP-BUE condition. 
Network Specification
472
Our test three-link network is shown in Figure 3 , where the link parameters are 473 specified in Table 1 . The parameters of the travel time function, Equation (7), are 474 β = 0.15 and n = 4. The total demand is assumed to be fixed at 15,000 vehicles 475 per hour. For simplicity, we consider a single user class. Note that in Table 1 , we specify a travel time reliability parameter of φ a for 477 route a as defined in Equation (8). The φ−value for the expressway is the lowest,
478
meaning that it is the route that could be most degradable although it is the shortest,
479
while the arterial route is assumed to be the most reliable with the highest φ−value. 
The TTR-BUE Solution Space
481
As the demand is fixed, the solution space for this three-link network can be
482
represented two-dimensionally with the horizontal axis and the vertical axis rep- 
483
Travel Time Budget (TTB) Versus General (TTR) BUE
492
The solution sets of the TTB-BUE formulation for different levels of risk aver- 
Travel Time Reliability BUE Versus Travel Time Budget and Late Arrival
506
Penalty UE Models
507
To compare our proposed bi-objective model with the single-objective formu- 
Here θ 2 represents the penalty weighting as the relative importance of the schedule 518 delay to the expected travel time. We tested a range of this penalty weighting θ 2 to 519 be between 10 and 50 in steps of 10, i.e. the extent of being late would be 10 to 50 520 times more important than the expected travel time, with the maximum time fixed 521 at τ = 50 minutes. We also tested a range of the maximum time τ to be between 522 40 and 50 minutes in steps of one minute, keeping θ 2 constant with value equals 523 30.
524
The resulting solutions are depicted in Figure 6 . As implied by Theorems 1, In this paper, we discussed two network equilibrium models for travel time re- the TTB and LAP user equilibrium models.
542
The essence of our proposed model is to represent rational route choice be- 
561
In future research, we will also develop methods to compute the TTR-BUE 562 solution set in general networks. We also intend to extend our work to include the 563 third of the criteria mentioned at the beginning of our paper, namely, monetary cost.
564
Furthermore, we will investigate the use of criteria other than standard deviation 
